Introduction
In Germany, 93 trades belong to what is legally defined as the crafts sector. They are governed by a set of laws, the so-called Trade and Crafts Code (TCC, Handwerksordnung) .
Until 2004, the law required the head of a crafts company to hold a Meister-degree, i.e. an advanced vocational training certificate. The regulation has subsequently changed, whereby 52 so-called B-trades such as brewers, interior decorators and musical instrument makers are now fully deregulated and no longer subject to any educational requirements (HwO §7.1).
Some trades such as bakers, butchers and car mechanics have been partially deregulated (A-trades hereafter), meaning that experienced employees without a Meister-degree may be permitted to start a business (HwO §7b, Altgesellenregel) . Finally, six trades (AC hereafter) remain fully regulated.
Using German microcensus data, Rostam-Afschar (2014, RA hereafter) finds that the reform led to an increase in both market entry and self-employment in all deregulated occupations, regardless of the extent to which they were deregulated. According to the author, exit probabilities remain unchanged. In section 2 of this paper, it will be shown that these results differ from those obtained from company registry data, according to which the increase in entry probabilities is more pronounced in the fully deregulated B-trades and less pronounced in the partially deregulated A-trades. Company registry data also shows a marked increase in exit probabilities in case of B-trades.
In section 3, we re-examine the impact of the 2004 deregulation on self-employment, entry and exit probabilities by using the microcensus data set. Our replication study tests whether RA's results are robust and not driven by some peculiarities of the data or the choice of model specification. As the company registry data suggests (and contrary to RA), we find a more pronounced increase in entry probabilities in B-trades rather than A-trades. There is also a marked increase in exit probabilities for fully deregulated B-trades. It seems that the discrepancy between RA and company registry data is mainly driven by the inclusion of building cleaners, as a very large B-trade. We argue that there are certain shortcomings with microcensus data in correctly identifying this craft occupation.
Company Registry Data
There is a discrepancy between RA's results and descriptive statistics based on company registration data. In this section, we discuss this data source in further detail and present relevant statistics.
According to the TCC, companies operating in the crafts sector are liable to public registration. This administrative data -including information on entry and exit -is gathered and maintained by local crafts chambers and subsequently aggregated at the national level by the German Confederation of Skilled Crafts (Zentralverband des Deutschen Handwerks, ZDH). The national data set is subsequently used by the German Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt) to compile its official statistics (Feuerhake, 2012) . ZDH data is subject to stringent data protection policies and it is only available in an aggregated format, i.e. without individual company observations. While information on the total number of firms is provided online1, information on exits can only be obtained by researchers upon request. 
Points of Departure
We proceed by re-examining the microcensus data set used by RA (2014). As with the original paper, we rely on linear difference-in-differences regressions.
Self-employment, entry and exist probabilities serve as dependent variables (see appendix B Code. Given that the MC dataset does not contain a crafts indicator, it is necessary to make a decision about how to classify the observations.
In his study, RA (2014 RA ( , 2010 ) developed a classification procedure based on occupation codes in the microcensus (KldB1992). The author kindly provided us with his list of occupation codes, which can be found in appendix A
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. We analyzed this list in detail, because it constitutes an important attempt to make the microcensus data utilizable for studies focusing on the German crafts sector. The thorough examination enabled us to conclude that the demarcation chosen by RA is most probably too broad: while it certainly includes many of the occupations that German craftsmen would practice, it also very likely contains a large proportion of non-crafts individuals who are unaffected by the policy reform.
Therefore, in our replication study, we decided to develop a new classification system that is still based on the occupation codes of the microcensus (KldB1992) yet also uses additional information, allowing us to exclude a number of non-craft workers. Details of the procedure are provided in appendix A. Comparing the sample based on RA's original 3 Age, age squared, female, East Germany dummy, nationality dummies for being German, European or other, professional qualification dummies, school degree dummies, dummies indicating the number of children in the household, dummies for marital status, years, branch, occupation and city size. 4 'Realschule', as opposed to 'Hauptschule', is the most important secondary schooling degree for craftsmen as there are very few individuals with 'Abitur', which enables access to tertiary education. In terms of postsecondary education, most craftsmen have either completed vocational training ('Geselle') or the more advanced 'Meister' degree. 5 We are reproducing the list of occupations in the RA classification scheme with the permission of the author in appendix A.
demarcation with our sample, we observe that around 97,000 (43%) of RA's observations are not included in our study.
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(ii) There are two channels in which the reform may have increased exit probabilities.
First, the reform directly affects exit probabilities by increasing the level of competition, deliberate temporary self-employment, etc. We expect the interaction term coefficient to be positive from a theoretical perspective and due to the empirical findings emerging from company registry data (see section 2).
Second, the reform also indirectly affects exit probabilities by lowering the level of education of market entrants after 2004 (especially in the fully deregulated B-trades). It can be hypothesized that entrepreneurs with little training are more likely to exit compared with those with advanced vocational training. In other words, the reform effect is partially mediated by the education variables in our model (see Baron and Kenny, 1986; MacKinnon et al., 2007; Judd and Kenny, 1981 ; also see Heckman and Pinto, 2015; Imai et al., 2010) .
Following Judd and Kenny (1981) , Table 2 presents exit probabilities results both with and without education controls. Our main result of increased exit probabilities holds regardless of whether we control for education or not. A more detailed discussion of mediation can be found in appendix C.
(iii) Finally, we also adapted the definition of the treatment groups. The original paper distinguished between A1-and A2-trades, referring to the so-called easy-job rule, which eliminates the master qualification standard for a limited set of tasks that can be learned within three months. However, the easy-job rule actually applies indiscriminately to A1-and A2-trades (see Müller, 2006) , meaning that there is no reason to differentiate between them.
Results
3.2.1. Self-employment levels and entry Table 1 displays the regression coefficients for the dependent variables self-employment and entry. The interaction term for both treatment groups (A and B) positively affects selfemployment. However, in contrast to RA, we note distinct effect sizes for the two groups.
While self-employment increases by almost 6 percentage points in the completely deregulated B-trades (specification 7), the effect is notably smaller for A-trades (1.6
6 RA (2014) states that he uses alternative classifications in which unclear cases are omitted from the analysis. According to the author, these robustness checks do not affect his main results. For example, the author states in FN8: "the results do not change if all occupational codes associated with more than one group, e.g., a B1-occupation and a B2-occupation, are excluded from the sample." By contrast, our sample based on a refined classification of occupations produces different results.
percentage points), which are only partially deregulated. This difference in effect sizes is in line with company registry data (see section 2).
Specification 9 in table 1 presents results for the case whereby the B-trade variable only comprises cleaners. While the descriptive ZDH data (figure 1) strongly suggests a rapid expansion of self-employment, the LPM coefficient indicates an increase by only 1.3 percentage points. This peculiar result increases our suspicions about this occupation code (see appendix A) and our decision to remove it from the sample.
Regardless of which entry variable we use (see appendix B for details), the reform appears to have caused a wave of new entrepreneurship for B-trades. Depending on the specification (1-4), effect sizes range from 1.0 to 1.8 percentage points. Given that the average probability of entry equals 0.81% in the overall sample, the reform's impact must be interpreted as large. In contrast to RA, we do not find a corresponding increase of entry probabilities for A-trades. In specification 1 and 2, the coefficient is positive but not statistically significant at conventional levels. Finally, there is no evidence of increased entry for cleaners (specification 5). Again, this increases our suspicions about this occupation code (see appendix A) and contributes to our decision to remove it from the sample.
Exit probabilities
In our estimation of exit probabilities, we cannot safely rely on the control group AC because the number of identifiable exits per year within this category is quite small. Instead, we compare the development of exits in B with the aggregate of A-and AC-trades. As opposed to RA, we find an increase in exit probabilities by between 2.0 and 2.5 percentage points (specification 1 and 2). As the mean exit probabilities per year in our data set are below four percent, this change represents a considerable increase in exits for the fully deregulated part of the crafts sector. Our result again mirrors the conclusions based on company registry data discussed above (figure 2).
Given that education can be expected to reduce the likelihood of exiting the market, if a number of entrepreneurs with little training enter the market, we hypothesize exit probabilities to rise. For a more detailed discussion of education as a mediating variable, see appendix C. Regardless of whether education is controlled for or not, the interaction term coefficient (treatment group B and post-2004) remains positive and statistically significant (specification 1 and 2). However, once the cleaner category is included (specification 3 and 4), the interaction term is no longer positive and significant. If the B-trade variable only comprises cleaners (specification 5), the interaction is negative and statistically significant.
This result sharply contrasts the company registry data discussed in section 2. It appears that the inclusion of cleaners is the main reason for the difference between our results and those in RA (2014).
Sensitivity tests and a discussion of causality
We re-run the exit probability regression to assess the causal interpretability of our results (appendix D).
While the reform of occupational licensing was put into practice on January 1, 2004, the interviews for the microcensus were conducted in April of the same year. In specification 2, table 7, we recode the year 2004 as being part of the post-policy period. Specification 1 drops all observations for that year, whereby the interaction term coefficient remains positive and significant in both specifications. Interestingly, the effect size is slightly larger than before. Our first "placebo" specification (3) Strict licensing rules constitute an ex-ante selection mechanism, through which only highly skilled craftsmen are permitted to enter the market. Less restrictive licensing allows for increased market competition and an ex-post selection of unsuccessful firms.
Using microcensus data, RA (2014) finds a uniformly positive effect of the reform on market entry and self-employment and no change in exit probabilities. We have identified a discrepancy between these findings and descriptive company registry statistics, pointing to a more pronounced increase in entry in the fully deregulated trades compared to partially deregulated trades. In addition, company registry data shows a marked increase in exit probabilities for fully deregulated B-trades. After replicating the original study, we have shown that the identified discrepancies are driven by differences in sample selection. The occupational classification chosen by RA is most probably too broad: while it certainly includes many of the occupations that German craftsmen would practice, it also very likely contains a large proportion of non-crafts individuals. However, when assessing the implications of a particular policy change in the crafts sector, it is paramount that the sample entirely comprises individuals within this sector.
Our analysis of the microcensus data suggests that the reform has had a larger impact on entries in fully deregulated trades rather than partially deregulated trades.
Moreover, there is evidence of an increase in exit probabilities in fully deregulated B-trades.
Both results correspond to official company registry data. It is shown that the discrepancy between RA's analysis and official data is mainly driven by difficulties in correctly identifying the large B-trade of building cleaners based upon microcensus data.
Our study also sheds some light on the appropriate use of microcensus data. Even if there is no clear-cut crafts indicator in this data set, it is nevertheless suitable for analyzing the skilled crafts sector if some care is taken regarding the classification of occupations. We provide one such classification scheme and a discussion of the underlying methodology in appendix A. 165,956 204,137 192,643 German Microcensus data for the years 2002 -2009 has been used. P-values are displayed in parentheses. dEU is equal to one if a foreigner was born in an EU country. 'Entry 1' is constructed as described by RA. 'Entry 2' is constructed as described in appendix B.
The following control variables are used: Secondary education (POS, Realschule, Fach-Abitur, Abitur), tertiary education (dual vocational training, school-based vocational training, master craftsmen, university for applied sciences, university degree, Ph.D.), age, age squared and cubed, gender, citizenship, state dummies, city size dummies, marital status, no. of children, year dummies, branch and occupation controls. In a second step, we used data provided online by BiBB concerning the information about how many apprentices within one occupational field are trained within either crafts companies or non-crafts (mainly industrial) companies. 7 We subsequently computed a proportion of crafts apprentices within each occupational code. To exclude occupation codes with a high proportion of non-crafts workers, we used the information on the proportion of crafts trainees and dropped codes if this proportion was less than 60%. Lowering or increasing this cut-off point by up to 20% hardly affects the classification as most occupations contain either a very low or a high proportion of craftsmen. We also removed observations if occupations could not be clearly marked as either an A or B occupation.
This method is not error-proof as it assumes that the proportion of crafts trainees strongly correlates with the proportion of crafts employees. However, this method allows us to remove some of the occupation codes from the analysis that most probably contain very low proportions of crafts workers. For example, while the KldB code 141 ), only three of these seven occupations belong to the crafts sector. Appendix B: Construction of entry and exit variables There are two possible approaches to constructing dummies that indicate market entry. RA uses a 45% sub-sample of the microcensus, whereby he compares the employment status of the previous year and the year of the survey. However, given that previous employment information is not part of the mandatory microcensus section, there is a possible answer selection bias. Alternatively, one may rely on information about the start of current employment, which is part of the mandatory section of the questionnaire. If the starting date for self-employment coincides with the year of the survey, it is coded as a market entry. As the questionnaire is completed around March of each year, market entry during the summer, fall and winter is not recorded in this way. We report the regression results for both of these variables.
The exit variable is constructed as described by RA (2014), based on the nonmandatory question about the employment status in the previous year.
Appendix C: Mediating variables
Mediation refers to a causal chain when a variable A affects the mediating variable B, which in turn affects variable C. At the same time, A can also cause C directly. The concept was developed in psychology (Baron and Kenny, 1986; Judd and Kenny, 1981; MacKinnon et. al, 2007 ) but has recently also been applied to econometric analyses (see Heckman and Pinto, 2015) .
In the context of our paper, the reform (A) lowers the educational credentials of market entrants (B), which in turn increases the exit probabilities in the market (C). At the same time, the reform is hypothesized to directly increase exit as the level of competition is higher than prior to 2004.
In order to explore mediation pathways, Baron and Kenny (1986) suggest performing four regressions in which each component of the causal chain is examined separately. The first regression does not include mediation variables (education), i.e. the direct channel from reform to exit probability. The second and third regressions follow the mediation channel (reform to education, education to exit probability). Finally, if the first three regressions have established significant relationships, the fourth model uses all variables.
The regression results without education controls can be found in table 2, while the regression results for steps two and four can be found in table 6. There is evidence of the existence of a mediation channel. The relationship between the reform and education is negative. Education and exit probabilities are also negatively related. The negative reform effect on exit probabilities holds regardless of whether we control for education or not. German Microcensus data has been used. P-values are displayed in parentheses. dEU is equal to one if a foreigner was born in an EU country. The variable 'exit' is constructed as described by RA. The following control variables are used: Secondary education (POS, Realschule, Fach-Abitur, Abitur), tertiary education (dual vocational training, school-based vocational training, master craftsmen, university for applied sciences, university degree, Ph.D.), age, age squared and cubed, gender, citizenship, state dummies, city size dummies, marital status, no. of children, year dummies, branch and occupation controls. 
